Week 5: Closing argument, 198a-201c
Last time, Socrates examined Nicias, who suggested that courage should be thought of as knowledge of what is threatening and reassuring. Socrates raised two issues. First, “knowledge of what is threatening and reassuring” does not seem to relate specifically to courage; a similar definition could be given of other things, even of something as mundane as farming. Second, if we say that courage is a kind of knowledge, we have a problem explaining the common view that lions and other animals have courage. Laches expressed considerable skepticism, but Socrates said, let’s give Nicias another chance to explain himself. That part of the discussion is our topic for today.
Socrates begins by clarifying with Nicias that courage is considered “part of” or perhaps a variety of, excellence, along with self-control and justice. From this it follows that if courage is knowledge, we need to identify the specific type of knowledge that makes up courage.
Socrates then suggests that the type of knowledge making up courage is knowledge of what is threatening (i.e., things that cause fear, defined as the anticipation of evil) and what is reassuring (i.e., things that do not cause fear).
What do you think of Socrates’ suggestion, made to clarify what Nicias has been saying, that courage is knowledge that distinguishes things that cause fear from other things?
The editor notes that Socrates’ suggestion is rationalistic, as one might expect from the fact that it is grounded in knowledge. Socrates has little to say directly about the emotional side of fear. Is the emotional side implicit? After all, why do we care about knowledge of potentially evil events unless we are tempted, emotionally, to try to avoid them (when our duty may require us to do otherwise)?
Socrates also notes that only future events cause fear. What does that mean?
We don’t fear past events, however horrific they may have been for those who experienced them. Socrates concludes that, for Nicias, courage is knowledge of future events that cause fear or don’t cause fear.
What is Socrates’ point starting at 198d?
That every branch of knowledge includes both future and past events. This seems relatively uncontroversial. A farmer looks back on past years to aid his plans for the coming year. A physician considers his experience when anticipating the course of a familiar disease.
Is this point a problem for Nicias?
It appears to undercut Nicias’ view (prompted by Socrates) that courage is a form of knowledge that looks only to future events.
Nicias seems to roll over pretty easily at 199c. Is there a genuine problem here? Can we suggest a response for Nicias to make?
How about: Sure, courage requires knowledge of past as well as future, just like farming. But just as the farmer’s knowledge has practical effect only in the future, the same is true of courage.
Once Nicias agrees that courage includes knowledge of the past, Socrates makes the following point at 199d: If courage is knowledge of what is threatening and reassuring both in the past and the future, how is it different from any other part of virtue. Wouldn’t the man with such encyclopedic knowledge have all the virtues, not just courage? Nicias agrees quickly, but what do you think of Socrates’ point?
Further questions for discussion:
- Socrates concludes that “we all became equally stuck” in the effort to define courage.
- What is aporia? Is it healthy?
- What is the result of this dialogue? Have we advanced in our knowledge of courage (or education in general)?
- Do you have a definition of courage? Is courage persistence based on knowledge of what is threatening and reassuring?
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