Plato’s Laches

Week 4: Nicias joins the discussion, 194c-197e

Overview

Last time, we saw Socrates interviewing Laches about the definition of courage. We asked whether courage was susceptible to definition. If so, are we trying to find a common factor in courageous actions, or a common factor in people of courage, or are we trying to define courage itself?

Laches defined courage as mental persistence, which he amended to intelligent mental persistence. What he had in mind was that, when we applaud someone for an act of courage, we are applauding his or her (intelligent) persistence in the face of adversity.

Laches’ attempted definition has its attractions. When we think of acts of courage, we think of people “sticking to their guns” despite risk. However, we don’t applaud someone for standing (unintelligently) in front of a speeding train or charging bull. Here’s a question: suppose Fred plans to climb the north face of the Eiger during winter, a first ascent on a mountain that has taken many lives. Objectively, Fred has a decent chance of dying on his climb. Do we say that Fred is acting courageously?

I think that we, like Laches, assume that courage is a good thing. We want to find courage only where we applaud the action on display. Is this assumption a good one, though, and, as a method, is it valid? Might we not find something that can be defined clearly but then further contextualized in specific cases to mark it as good or bad?

We saw Laches pushed to the point of aporia. Under Socrates’ questioning, he admitted that the unskillful warrior (or well diver) displays more courage than his skillful counterpart because he has more risk, more to fear, because he cannot be confident that his skill will see him through. However, Laches also wants to say that the unskillful warrior or well diver is less admirable than his skillful counterpart because of his relative lack of intelligence. Laches defined courage as intelligent persistence. So, Laches is in a bind and the conversation turns to Nicias, with Socrates continuing to claim ignorance of the whole subject.

How does Nicias start, what is his initial contribution?

He fairly clearly suggests that courage, like other virtues, is a kind of knowledge. “So if a courageous man is a good man, he must be a knowledgeable man.” 194d. What is your reaction to this? Do you say, “Oh yes, he is on the right track: courage is a type of knowledge,” or do you say, “What? How can courage be a type of knowledge”?

The natural question is this: If courage is a type of knowledge, what is it knowledge of? What is Nicias’ response to that? Do you agree with him? Is that a sensible or useful answer?

Laches is not impressed: “What a weird idea, Socrates!” What is his challenge to the idea that courage is knowledge of what is threatening and reassuring?

Note the form of argument here, which is typically Socratic/Platonic. A definition is suggested, like the notion that courage is the knowledge of what is good and bad. The challenge is of this form: here is some knowledge of what is good and bad, but it is not courage. Therefore, the definition has failed to pick out what is distinctive about courage.

What is Nicias’ response to Laches’ challenge? What does he say about the knowledgeable doctor?

Can you find a parallel in the case of the farmer?

What do you think of Nicias’ definition of courage as knowledge of what is best, not within a particular field of study, but more generally?

Could one define other virtues the same way? How about justice? Could it be defined as a knowledge of what is best? How about temperance and truthfulness? Same?

Are we closing in on a theory that all virtues are really the same?

Socrates chimes in at 196e to ask whether animals can be courageous. Some animals (lion, wild boar) were considered courageous from the way they attacked when hunted. What’s the problem with considering animals to be courageous at this point in the conversation?

How does Nicias answer the challenge about animal courage?

What do you think of the view that animals can’t be courageous because they lack knowledge?

Are we asking a moral or a grammatical question?

Do we think that animals can act morally? Can they display courage or other virtues (temperance, justice)?

Do you agree with Nicias’ distinction between courage and fearlessness? What is the difference?

General questions for discussion distilled from the above:

• Is courage a type of knowledge?
• Can animals be courageous? (Is that a moral or grammatical question?)
• What is Laches’ first definition of courage at 190e? What is Socrates’s criticism of it?
• Do you agree with Nicias’ distinction between courage and fearlessness? What is the difference?