World History

Unit 6: World War in the Twentieth Century

Chapter 27: World War II

Mon, Mar 31, 2014

56. Tue, Apr 1, 2014

In many ways, World War II is the most dramatic event of modern times, and perhaps of all history: the sheer scope of the struggle, the pure malevolence of the defeated foe, and the simple arc of the story from nadir to triumph all combine to make the war immensely powerful in our memories. Plus it can still be remembered: my grandfather fought in the war, and is still living. Finally everything that has come after it has been shaped by the experience of the war, and by the shadows of the two rising clouds that marked its end.

But to be honest, the war's outcome was almost a foregone conclusion, and the causes were far more muddled and complex than the book accounts for.

I will not say that the Allies were certain to win. In war nothing is certain — this is indeed why the Axis powers were even willing to undertake the fight: long odds are better than no odds. But the Allies possessed enormous advantages. Germany was going up against the three largest and wealthiest countries in the world: Britain, the US, and the Soviet Union. (The Soviets were not hugely wealthy, but they were huge in all other respects.) With Australia, India, and Canada at Britain's disposal, Hitler was keenly aware that he was essentially facing down the resources of three continents, especially as he was always convinced the US would eventually come in on Britian's side. Hitler therefore had to conquer as much as possible just to survive. His invasion of the USSR, long seen by historians as an incomprehensible mistake, was actually due to cold logic: if he did not capture Soviet-controlled Ukraine, Germany would starve. Germany's famous "lightning war" tactics were born of necessity: if the war wasn't won quickly, Hitler knew, it wouldn't be won at all. Japan faced a similar calculation: its navy, dependant upon oil, would run out of fuel within two years (and leave the islands defenseless) unless foreign oil wells were captured.

In contrast, the United States essentially supplied itself, Britain, Canada, China, and (later) France with weapons, fought a war on two fronts and won on both, and spent vast resources designing, producing, and testing a new and totally unproven type of weapon. The Soviet Union could do still more.

The war was not easily won. Hitler's gambles paid off for a time, the Allies suffered heavy losses early on, and as in every war, there was a measure of incompetence and bad luck. But the Axis powers were always the underdogs, no matter how powerful they seemed at the time. This leads us to a few important points. The book presents Hitler as a man bent on conquest — which he was. But there's considerable evidence that he was not so much planning on conquering the world as just making a desperate bid for survival. The historian AJP Taylor hypothesized that Hitler blundered into war, and the economic data support this aspect of Taylor's hypothesis. Which reveals that, as like all bullies large or small, Hitler was governed first and foremost by fears. Some, like his fear of an international Jewish conspiracy, were irrational (though far from unique). Others, like his fear of the US and Great Britain arrayed against him, were absolutely real. Japan was also driven by terror, a terror of being left defenseless before the West (again) — and in a way it emulated the West by conquering colonies. To their dismay they now found their efforts (not much different from the Scramble for Africa, for example) deeply frowned upon.

• What can we learn from this economic view of the war?
• What can we learn from this emotional (i.e., fear-driven) view of the war's causes? Is there anything applicable to the present in this?
• The war in the Pacific broke out in no small part because the United States simply did not trust Japan, and thus continually escalated demands until Japan saw only two options: war, or total economic subjugation. The reason for this American distrust, of course, was due to Japan's refusal to withdraw from China. What lessons can we draw from these twin acts of stubbornness?

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