Plato’s Euthyphro

Week 5: The Euthyphro Dilemma

Euthyphro’s third attempt to define piety

Last week we summarized Euthyphro’s first two attempts to answer Socrates’ question, what is piety? His first attempt was to point at himself as an example of someone performing a pious act (prosecuting his own father). Socrates said he wanted a definition, not an example. Euthyphro’s second try was to define pious acts as those loved or approved by the gods. In response, Socrates pointed out that the gods reportedly disagree amount many things, so “what the gods approve” is hardly a reliable definition.

Euthyphro takes Socrates’ criticism seriously and tries again. He says (8b) that even if the gods disagree about many things, surely they all agree that someone who kills unjustly must bear the penalty. Notice that under pressure of Socrates’ questions Euthyphro’s initial rather careless definition is becoming more refined and thoughtful, though not necessarily more accurate as a report of his own view. Notice also that the focus has shifted from piety to justice. We will return to this.

Socrates’ response to Euthyphro’s third effort is interesting. He admits that everyone (human and divine) agrees on the general principle that unjust actions merit penalties, but he points out that the law courts are full of people disputing whether particular acts are just or unjust. He gets Euthyphro to agree that the gods probably have similar debates. (8e) It appears that Euthyphro’s latest proposal (unjust acts merit penalties) leaves a critical question unanswered: which acts are just and unjust? In particular, Euthyphro has not shown that his own action, prosecuting his father for the murder of a family servant, is just.

At this point, someone might object, “I know perfectly well what piety is! It means worshipping the gods through sacrifices, processions, theatrical presentations, and the like.” There are two problems with this objection. First, it does not appear to represent Euthyphro’s own view about piety. One might almost say that Euthyphro thinks of piety as doing what the gods do (like avenging injustice) rather than doing what people do to show homage to the gods. Second, even if we accept the view that piety consists in conventional demonstrations of homage, we have not yet been assured that pious acts are virtuous.

The Euthyphro dilemma

Having posed the challenge that Euthyphro should explain why his own actions are just (9a), Socrates quickly (9d) shifts the discussion and says he will let Euthyphro off the hook because he has a different question to ask. Even if all the gods would approve prosecuting Euthyphro’s father, what follows? At this point, Socrates launches into a lengthy and somewhat tortuous discussion (10a-11a) of the following question: Is a particular act pious because the gods approve it, or do the gods approve the act because they recognize that it is pious?

Socrates’ discussion at this point presents what is sometimes called the Euthyphro Dilemma. It is a dilemma because the two options (an act is pious because the gods approve it, or the gods approve it because it is pious) appear to exhaust the possibilities and because both options appear to lead to unpleasant conclusions. If an act is pious because the gods approve it, perhaps the gods could change their minds and make lying or even murder pious; that doesn’t seem right. On the other hand, if the gods approve an act because they recognize it is pious, it appears we have made no progress in our effort to define piety, we have just discovered that the gods like pious acts, whatever they may be.

Some questions

At this point, our discussion could lead in various directions, reflected in the questions below.

1. What is Euthyphro’s real understanding of piety (when he is not confused by Socrates’ questions)?
2. What is Socrates up to? What is he really trying to find out? What kind of answer would satisfy him?
3. Is either Euthyphro or Socrates pious in the traditional Greek sense?
4. Why is Socrates’ argument posing the Euthyphro Dilemma so convoluted?
5. Assuming we are not very invested in the Greek gods, is the Euthyphro Dilemma a concern for Jews and Christians? Are our actions good or bad simply because the God of the Bible approves of them? Or does God approve of certain actions because he sees that they are good? Are those the only possibilities?

If you’re reading along in Greek, cover 10a5-11e6.