Plato’s Crito

Week 6: Obligations at law and in society

Premise: One should fulfill (just) agreements. 49e – 54d

This week we look at Socrates’ extended discussion with the “Laws of Athens” about what is the just course of action following what Socrates and Crito both assume was an unjust conviction. Should Socrates seek to escape?

Previously Socrates and Crito established that it is always wrong to cause harm, even in retaliation for harm by others. We saw that this was a controversial point.

This section starts with the interesting question (at 49e):

Ought one to fulfill all one’s agreements, provided that they are right (just, dikaia), or break them?

This formulation suggests a general rule in favor of keeping agreements, but also a limit to that rule: the agreement must be just. Let’s consider this principle. Are there any agreements that American law would not enforce?

• We proceed to talk to the Laws of Athens. Do the Laws seem to recognize any limitation on their authority, any way for the citizen to say, “Your decrees are generally to be followed, but not if they are unjust.”

Notice incidentally that while this whole dialogue is about what it is just for Socrates to do, there is (somewhat surprisingly when we think about other Socratic dialogues) no discussion about the nature of justice. The closest we get is the Laws’ argument that their commands should be obeyed. Let’s think about the Laws’ argument, which is intended to lead to the conclusion that Socrates is morally bound to respect his conviction even if it was unjust. The initial pitch is that by defying his conviction Socrates would be involved in trying to destroy the state of Athens. That sounds dire; neither Socrates nor Crito wants to be held responsible for destroying Athens just because of one unjust decree. Let’s consider whether the Laws make a good case.

• By living in Athens and taking advantage of its laws, you have implicitly agreed to abide by all of the laws’ decrees.

What do we think of this? Are there are other areas of life where we implicitly agree to things? What about ordering food from a menu in a restaurant? If the food is delivered, have we agreed to pay the listed price?

In the previous example, the consequence of ordering the food was express. What if no prices are listed? Have we agreed to whatever price the restaurant decides to charge? What if the restaurant decides that the cost of a steak is the life of your eldest son?

Here is a revised version of the Laws’ argument:

• Given that you are free to leave Athens if you like, staying and participating in its civic life is implicit agreement to all of its decrees, unless you can persuade us to change those decrees (and Socrates did not succeed in doing this at his trial).

If you’re reading along in Greek, cover 50a6-51c4.